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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSTLER LODGE and STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 14616

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and RAYEL JENSEN,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's "Statement of the Facts" is substantially correct
as to the facts stated therein, but defendants wish to make the
following additions and modifications to such facts:
Mr. Thompson, the manager, took Mr. Jensen over the entire
job and explained what was to be done in each area. (R.16)

The

manager directed other employees who were installing accoustic tile
as to what was to be done. (R.17)

Jensen was requested by Thompson

to do some patching and texturing if he was capable of matching the
color. (R.16)

Thompson asked Jensen to get some accoustic tile

for a ceiling. (R.17)

The accoustic tile was being installed by

plaintiff's employees. (R.17)

Repairing of structural damage,

taking care of the leaks, and general light construction was
being performed all over the building. (R.37,38)

Plaintiffs

employed three handymen and a maintenance man. (R.45)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WORK DONE BY APPLICANT WAS IN FACT WORK PERFORMED IN THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY
RUSTLER LODGE AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-1-42, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
As stated by counsel for plaintiff's, "The facts of this
case are not really questioned by either side". The issue is
basically how these agreed facts are applied to the above
mentioned statute.
Section 35-1-42(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides in
part;
M

....Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose
work he retains supervision or control and such work is a
part or process in the trade or business of the employer,
such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and
all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed
by any such subcontractor, shall be deemed, within the
meaning of this section, employees of such original
employer...." (Underscoring added)
The problem narrows itself to whether or not there are sufficient facts upon which the Commission based a decision that the
sheetrock work was a "part or process in the trade or business
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of the employer.

i

i especf *:nH

submitted that there Is

more than sufficient evidence t •> supper'1; such a fincing.
*: ". - denied the

The administrative law jucjclaim jfi Air. A

i

Luund specifically in his finding number 4.

"The o.odge regularly employs a dining room stall, j.'impx*] *,< "
bus boys, waitress::-, cc-.-

f

-^washers, etc. and it employs

thr?e handy men and a maintenance man "
finding number 11 he state-

•

'R.54)
*

Furtnei

»ac sheetrock repairs

--• - - : s is not par*- of ;;he regular business of
Rustler Lod-e sc iar as hospitality serv_--r

ncernpd,

but it is nevertheless an ancillary activity common to most any
business•"

(R.55) (Underscoring added)

The uncontradicted testimony ol . Anspn, t:hat " light construc; •- .

--* • ~* /

I T performed a^l

;ver the bu-ldmc"

cy young people adir :etedi ; eiu^^jyec .i A..= ...-.
purchase

.........

_,

f

- .
'

_e)
The

3f accoustic tile by Rustler Lodge

(R.I7, ill. tended tj sr.c« the extensive nature
project unae rt—_*:uot:~T fron Larscr
app e a r s t h e i _• 11:, A ...., g a:

• w,rkr?.ens C o m p e n s a t i o n Law a t g -i
• ,-

I]

t ! » i rj u e s t i o n o f emp 1 oyme n t

statu;-!: n

" :t^ closest, the most, cc-ntiuvei JJ.CU *:C i.:ie most
numerous cases on status are those involving services, such
as repair, maintenance, and incidental construct : :-r :r
installation, that are not ir. th ? everyday rnaxnstrear :z

production activity. The jobs involved range all the way
from single nonrecurring projects to regularly recurring
tasks requiring a large fraction of the workers time. The
workers range from individuals doing odd jobs in their
spare time to established businesses with many employees
and customers. The employments include window washers,
welders, well cleaners, watchmen, house detectives,
steeple-jacks, roofers, plumbers, plasterers, painters,
mechanics, machinists, engineers, electricians, carpenters,
masons, boiler repairmen, blacksmiths and repairmen of
all kinds.
The two poles between which the area of controversy
lies are these: First, it must be conceded that, in an
ordinary industrial operation, the maintenance and repair
of the plant are an integral part of the business....At
the opposite extreme it must also be conceded that every
businessman cannot be held to be the direct employer of
every plumber, electrician or painter that he might call
in to do necessary work on the premises.
The problem is to draw the line."
The traditional method has been to draw the line based upon
the element of supervision, direction or control over the particular individual.

As Larson says: "The independence of these

artisans is not to be determined by looking at the artisan or
job alone, but by judging how independent, separate, and public
his business service is in relation to a particular employer."
(supra)
Viewed in this light it appears that under the theory of
ancillary services of this employer, ie. maintenance of his
building and property, Jensen was in fact engaged in the same
work as the employer and "such work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer."
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It was a fact that maintenance

was the service performed by Jensen and maintenance was a
service being actively performed by other employees of this same
employer.
Iri

••

Sommerville v. Industrial Commission 118 U. 504,1 96

P 2d ' Id,

( i 'J 4 :J I L h i s court r e so 1 ved the que s t io n o £ s t at u s by

declaring it to be a jurisdictional question.

The court said

I n part,
"The question of whether or not one engaged ii i a
service for another is an employee or an independent
contractor, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation A c t , is a juriadictional question, presenting
a situation which requires this con rt to determine the
status from the facts submitted, by a preponderance of the
evidence. But where, as here, the evidence in the case
is largely uncontradicted, the problem, i s not so much one
of examining the record to determine whether the evidence
preponderates for or against the conclusion of the Commission, but rather of determining whether the Commission
drew the correct legal conclusion therefrom.."
Unlike counsel for plaintiffs # the principal enunciated
by the court is true - status is a jurisdictional question
resolved by applying the facts to the applicable law - but
the fact \ " i Uommervi.il v.-, i M ^ i ui;v . • 1. r. ci r L '£ A ± si i IHJUI ^liable
from the instant case.
Ii I Sommer v ille, si ipi: a , i: I ::> e ;/:i dence ; » as available that
defendant was engaged in maintenance and repair activities, no
evidence was available that the coffee shop operated by defendants
was the subject of the ma intenance a nd r apa :i r k i i t a bi :i :i 1 d:i ng
separate and d istinct from the employer, no evidence was available

that defendant participated and supervised the details of the
maintenance activity.

No other employees of the employer were

engaged in maintenance activities.

For these reasons alone

there is sufficient distinction on the facts without detailing all
of the differences.
In Anderson v Last Chance Ranch Co./ 63 U. 551,228 P. 184,
(1924) the nature of the business arose as an issue because at
the statutory exclusion of agricultural employees.

Section 35-1-4,

(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part:
"The words 'employee', 'workmen' and 'operative',
as used in this title shall be construed to mean:
(2) Every person, except agricultural laborers
and domestic servants, in the service of any 'employer1
as defined in subdivision (2) of section 35-1-42 who
employes one or more workmen or operatives regularly
in the same business...."
The court in construing the above section was only concerned
about the "general business of the employer".

The court held

that the "ranch company" was engaged in agricultural pursuits
and not building construction.

The effect of the finding was to

establish that the "employer" was in fact not a covered employer
under the act and the claim of the employee failed.
The claim failed - not because the employee was in a
different status from that of the employer.

The claim failed

because the employer was excluded from required coverage because
the employer was engaged in agricultural pursuit.
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It appears that this case actually presents an argument
in favor of defendants since the court applied a broader rule
about status and said:
11

In a narrow and restricted view of the transaction,
plaintiff at the very moment of his injury was an agricultural laborer....In the broader sense he was a carpenter's
helper...We are not inclined to dispose of the case upon
the narrow view above referred to". Anderson v Last Chance
Ranch, supra.
The court then proceeded to find - on the broader view that the employer was basically agricultural and not subject
to the act.
Suffice it to say that the activity engaged in by Jensen
was a part or process of the trade or business of Rustler Lodge.
Maintenance and repair constituted a substantial partion of
this employer's business at the time of the accident.

Jensen

was engaged in maintenance and repair of that business.
POINT II
THE LODGE DID SUPERVISE OR HAD THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE THE WORK OF JENSEN.
It is well settled in this state that the status of an
employee is essentially determined by either the supervision
in fact of the details of the work of the employee or the
right to exercise such supervision.
In the Sommerville case, supra, the court held:
11

It is now well settled in the jurisdiction that
the crucial factor in determining whether an applicant
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for workmen's compensation is an employee or an independent
contractor is whether or not the person for whom the
services were performed had the right to control the
execution of the work."
With this general statement, the plaintiff then proceeds to
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220. The administrative
law judge proceeded on the same basis and listed nine separate
tests the Restatement uses to establish the distinction between
servant and independent contractor.
This court has already stated the "crucial factor" in determining the status is "whether or not the person for whom the
services were performed had the right to control the execution
of the work."

Sommerville, supra.

Let us here review the facts on the element of control.
Thompson took Jensen over the entire job and explained what
was to be done in each area. (R.16)
obtain accoustic tile. (R.18)

Jensen was directed to

On his first appearance for work

Jensen was told he could not work. (R20)
where to stack the sheetrock.
and protect the floor. (R21)
cussed by Thompson. (R.16)

Employer told Jensen

Jensen was directed to use care
Texturing and matching was dis-

Rate of pay was set by owner. (R.22)

Ladders were supplied by lodge. (R.31)

What more need be said

on the elements of control.in fact, without discussing the right
to control.
In Plewe Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 U. 2d
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223, 364 P.2d 1020 the matter of control by a general contractor
over a subcontractor was discussed at length.

In that case a

roofing contractor employed shinglers and paid them by the
square to install a roof on a building erected by the general
contractor.

An employee of the roofing contractor was hurt.

The roofing contractor had no insurance but Plewe, the general
contractor did.

Plewe1s control consisted of advising the

roofers to lay the shingles straight and use a chalk line. The
court held that Plewe exercised sufficient control over the work
to find that the employees of the subcontractor were statutory
employees of Plewe and entitled to benefits.
In a more recent case this court again spelled out the
criteria to use in arriving at this nebulous thing called control
or right to control.

In Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. v.

Industrial Comm. 538 P.2d 316 this court said:
"This is one of the frequently encountered cases
which justifies the view taken by the commission that the
employer wanted the 'best of two worlds1. On the one hand,
to have a person rendering the service over whom he can
maintain a high degree of control; and at the same time
give the person the status of an independent contractor
to avoid the responsibilities he would have to an employee.
The trouble arises when an employee is injured he wants
to be classified as an employee and get workmen1s compensation.

In determining whether the statutory requirements
are met, the courts have considered numerous factors
relating to the employer-employee relationship, and have
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pointed out that none of them considered alone is completely
controlling, but that they all should be considered together
in determining whether the requirements of the statute are
met.
Speaking in generality; An employee is one who is
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to
perform the employer's work as directed by the employer
and who is subject to a comparatively high degree of
control in performing those duties. In contrast, an
independent contractor is one who is engaged to do some
particular project or piece of work, usually for a set
sum, who may do the job his own way, subject to only
minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only
for its satisfactory completion.
The main facts to be considered on the relationship
here are: (1) whatever covenants or agreements exist
concerning the right of direction and control over the
employee, whether express or implied; (2) the right to
hire and fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e. whether in
wages or fees as compared to payment for a complete job
or project; and (4) the furnishing of the equipment."
I submit that if the facts in this case are measured against
the standards set forth in the Young case above, the finding of
the employer-employee relationship is the proper finding in
this case.
POINT III
ASSUMING JENSEN IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE BUT AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, JENSEN IS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE
UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTION 35-1-42(2) UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
Section 35-1-42(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is quoted
above under Point I.

The significance of the quoted section

establishes the fact that even a wholly independent contractor
may still be considered an employee of the employer if the
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employer "retains supervision or control and such work is a
part or process in the trade or business of the employer."
The question of the "work as a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer" was thoroughly discussed in
Point I above.

The question of status was reviewed in Point II

along with the exercise of control.
For purposes of argument we now assume that Jensen was in
fact an independent contractor as claimed by plaintiffs.
this status preclude him from benefits?

Does

It is respectfully

submitted that it does not.
In the Plewe Construction Co. case, supra, a statutory
employee was created.
truly independent.

The roofing contractor in that case was

However, Plewe exercised some minimal control

and such minimal control was sufficient to create the statutory
employee.
This court has held in a number of cases involving third
party liability under the workmen's compensation act that subcontractors and employees of subcontractors are precluded from
sueing other subcontractors or general contractors in tort because all are considered to be in the same employment.

See

Galleqos v. Strinqham, 20 U. 2d 139,442 P.2d 31; Smith v. Alfred
Brown Co., 27 U.2d 155,493 P.2d 994. All of the decisions in this
area are essentially based upon the proposition that all the
individuals involved are in "the same employment."
-11-

Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in
part:
"When any injury or death for which compensation is
payable under this title shall have been caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same
employment, the injured employee...may have an action
for damages against such third person..." (Underscoring
added)
In all the decision construing this section, the exclusion
was extended more broadly than one would normally expect in
holding all parties to be in the same employment.

In some

cases little or no evidence of control was maintained by the
general contractor.

In fact, in suits between subcontractors

employes none existed.
If Jensen were to sue in tort for the negligence of Rustler
Lodge, rest assured that the defense would be "same employment"
effectively preventing Jensen from any remedy.
In the Gallegos case, supra, the Smith case, supra, Peterson
v. Fowler, 27 U. 2d 159, 493 P. 2d 997; Adamson v. Okland Construction Co. 29 U.2d 286,508 P., 2d 805 the control exercised by the
employer was minimal at best.

But in all cases, the parties

were all found to be in the same employment.
The element of being engaged in the same type of work is
clearly present.

The element of control - to whatever degree

one wants to find - is present.

The status of Jensen as an

independent contractor can be inferred.
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The ultimate fact appears

that Jensen is either a direct employee of Rustler Lodge or a
statutory employee of Rustler Lodge.

He must be one or the

other•
CONCLUSION
By careful analysis of the facts as determined by the
Industrial Commission and weighing them against the statute,
the conclusion reached by the Commission is inescapable.

Jensen

was an employee of Rustler - either direct or statutory.

The

Commission reached a proper result in applying those facts
against the appropriate law.
DATED, this

Such decision should be affirmed.

day of October, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY,
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
543 East 5th South #4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Attorney General
Utah State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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